PAB from GSJ

Fortunately I am not the NSC-4 working group because if I were, this

would be of no use whatsoever to me. The NSC-4 working group, however,

being more perspicacious than I, will understand what it means.

25X1A9a

I wonder by what slip the authors failed to get a copy of ███████

memorandum of 26 October, 1948. Not only has the question about the UNGA

been ignored, but they don't pay any attention that I can see to the "probable

consequences." Of course it's a little ambiguous as to what consequences

are to
are referred to and whom they/affect, but I should think some sort of consequences

would be dealt with somewherex.

Thexxxxxzizkxxkxxzxkixxxxk
As to assumptions, it would seem that they built up their own rather

than take the one they were given. The memorandum specifies Russian dis-

satisfaction and attempt to improve. I can't see where either of these

things is mentioned or even implied. Also, the specific questions aren't

really dealt with. The first one wants to know about advantages, disadvantages,

and consequences of a unilateral wit drawal. That is less discussed that

quadripartite ditto. The second one is on UNGA, which, as said, the authors

modestly declined to answer.

I don't happen to know what the NSC-4 (which [1] beléive was the designation

of a pre-PBY airplahe) wants to use this IM for, but I should suppose it would

be as a basis for preparing counter-arguments against the Soviet propaganda.

I wouldn't know whether or not it woud help them with this problem. About

all this says izzkhak relative to the point is that the Soviets could use any

withdrawal £or propaganda reasons, which is pretty easy for anyone to see. If

the group merely wants to know what sort of proposal the Soviets will make and

when, they wouldn't have a very clearcut answer either. Maybe they'll do

something after the summer of 1949 is about all [1] can get out of it.